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This study will look at Presidential and Congressional 
behavior in United States-Taiwan relations in 1979. Upon 
formalizing diplomatic relations with the People's Republic 
of China in December, 1978, President Carter severed dip-
lomatic relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan, 
terminated the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty, and imposed 
a one year moratorium on American arms sales to Taiwan. 
In so doing, Mr. Carter had reversed the thirty-year long 
American responsibility for the peace and security of 
Taiwan. 
The first part of this study will examine President 
* The author is a member of the research staff of the East Asian Security Project at 
Brown University. 
(1) 
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Carter's policy in this instance and show the negative effect 
it might have on Taiwan's security and the adverse impact 
it had on America's credibility as a defense partner. The 
second part will analyze Congressional response to the 
"derecognition" of the Republic of China on Taiwan and 
will look at the steps taken to restore the American com-
mitment existing before 1979. 
FROM THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE TO 
NORMALIZATION 
On February 21, 1972, President Nixon, Secretary of State Rog-
ers, and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger visited the Peo-
ple's Republic of China. It was the first visit by an American 
president to Communist China and, aside from the earlier Kissinger 
preparatory visits, the first high level American delegation to visit 
China since the Communist revolution. At the end of Mr. Nixon's 
stay the two countries issued the Shanghai Communique. 
The Nixon talks with Chinese leaders (including the ailing 
Chairman Mao) were described as "frank and earnest,"1 and each 
side "presented candidly to one another their views on a variety of 
issues."2 One of the issues discussed was the Taiwan question, which 
the Chinese described as "the crucial question obstructing the nor-
malization of relations between China and the United States."3 The 
Chinese side reiterated its contention that "the liberation of Taiwan 
is China's internal affair, in which no other country has a right to 
interfere."4 The Chinese also stated that "all US forces and military 
installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan."5 
The United States declared that its troops would be gradually 
withdrawn "as the tension in the area diminishes."6 The American 
side also stated that it "acknowledges that all Chinese on either side 
of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Tai-
wan is part of China. The United States Government does not chal-
lenge that position." President Nixon ceded no ground to the 
Chinese on the Taiwan question. While his administration did not 
l. "Joint U.S.-China Communique issued at Changhai, China", in Of Grave Con-
cern: U.S.-Taiwan Relations on the Threshold of the i980s (Washington, D.C.: The 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1981), p. 46. 
2. Ibid 
3. Ibid, p. 49. 
4. ibid 
5. Ibid 
6. ibid. pp. 49, 50. 
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challenge the position held by Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan 
Strait that there is one China and Taiwan is part of China, it did not 
accept the claim of Communist sovereignty over Taiwan. The fact 
that the American side did not recognize the Chinese position also 
left open the possibility for the Chinese people there to choose a 
German model solution to their future. 
The American side specifically avoided discussion of the US-
ROC Mutual Defense Treaty. President Nixon was not willing to 
sacrifice our relationship with Taiwan in order to normalize relations 
with Peking. Immediately after his visit to Mainland China, Mr. 
Nixon sent Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green to Taiwan 
with a message of reassurance, pledging that "faithfully honoring all 
our commitments remains a cornerstone of US policy."7 Between 
February, 1972 and the summer of 1974 the Nixon Administration 
reassured Taiwan fifty-two times that we would honor our commit-
ment to them. 8 
It is not within the scope of this paper to analyze the Nixon 
Administration's reasoning for standing behind its commitment to 
Taiwan, but it can be deduced from the Shanghai Communique and 
other statements that Mr. Nixon understood the ethical and political 
implications involved in failing to maintain our defense commit-
ment. In his 1971 foreign policy message, President Nixon stated 
that "(t)he evolution of our dialogue with Peking cannot be at the 
expense of internal order or our own commitments. Our attitude is 
public and clear. We will continue to honor our treaty commitments 
to the security of our Asian allies. An honorable relationship with 
Peking cannot be constructed at their expense .... " 9 Seven years 
later, Mr. Nixon was to reaffirm this position in a letter to Represen-
tative Lester Wolff, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Asian 
and Pacific Affairs. Mr. Nixon wrote that while normalization with 
Peking was important in building a structure of peace in Asia and 
the world, we must also be concerned with the strength of our inter-
national commitments: "at a time when US credibility as a depend-
able ally and friend is being questioned in a number of countries, it 
is . . . vitally important that the Taiwan issue be handled in a way 
which will reassure other nations - whether old friends, new 
friends, potential friends or wavering friends - that it is safe to rely 
7. Hungdah Chiu, "The Taiwan Question in Sino-American Relations", in China 
and the Taiwan Issue, ed. Hungdah Chiu, (New Tork: Praeger, 1979), p. 180. 
8. Ibid 
9. Ibid, p. 178. 
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on America and to be America's friend." 10 
From the time Mr. Nixon left office until 1978, very little hap-
pened in the way of US-China rapproachment. The Ford Adminis-
tration was preoccupied with healing domestic wounds and made no 
real progress in Sino-American relations. All presidents, from Ei-
senhower to Ford, had insisted that before normalizing relations 
with the PRC we must be guaranteed that the Taiwan issue will be 
settled peacefully. This was basically the American sine qua non up 
until the Carter Administration. 
EXECUTIVE BEHAVIOR 
The Carter Administration 
Initially, President Carter had not been determined to normal-
ize relations with the People's Republic of China. Committed to 
"abiding by the principles laid out in the Shanghai Communique", 
the new Carter Administration approached the normalization issue 
cautiously.ll Four months into his term in office the President had 
settled on prerequisites for normalization: 1) Peking had to guaran-
tee it would not resort to force to settle the Taiwan issue; 2) the PRC 
would have to agree to US-Taiwan relations at the liaison level; and 
3) , Peking would have to allow a US pledge to Taiwan securityY 
But after one year in office, President Carter compromised on all 
three of these principles. 
On December 15, 1978, President Carter announced that the 
United States and the People's Republic of China had reached an 
agreement to establish full diplomatic relations. This announcement 
was the culmination of an eight year process set in motion by Presi-
dent Nixon. In taking this step, however, the Carter Administration 
had made several major concessions on long standing US principles 
regarding Taiwan. Peking had always insisted that in order for the 
two countries to normalize relations the United States must first: 
1) sever diplomatic relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan; 
2) withdraw all American troops from Taiwan; and, 3) terminate the 
1954 US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty. The Carter Administration, 
unlike its predecessors, acquiesced to all three of these demands and 
went further to gratuitously state that the United States recognizes 
10. Ibid., p. 198. 
11. Robert Downen, The Taiwan Pawn in the China Game: Congress to the Rescue 
(Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown 
University, 1979), p. 20. 
12. Ibid., p. 22. 
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"the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of 
China" and "acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one 
China and Taiwan is part of China" (emphasis added). 13 The Joint 
Communique stated that it was within this context that the People of 
the United States and the People on Taiwan would maintain cul-
tural, commercial, and other unofficial relations. In making these 
statements the Administration was not only withdrawing diplomatic 
recognition from Taipei, it was implicitly acknowledging PRC sover-
eignty over Taiwan. President Carter did not feel his behavior 
would jeopardize Taiwan's security because he had stated that the 
United States has an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan 
issue and expects the issue to be settled peacefully by the Chinese 
themselves. 
Administration Calculus 
The Carter Administration did not rest its entire policy merely 
on its expression of "interest" and "expectation." President Carter 
felt that several factors precluded the PRC's use of force against Tai-
wan. These were: 1) The PRC has inadequate amphibious capabil-
ity to mount a successful invasion of Taiwan; 2) Taiwan is heavily 
fortified, and the PRC would have to pay a high price for it's cap-
ture; 3) The PRC has to contend with 44 divisions of Soviet troops 
along it's northern border and hostile Vietnamese troops along its 
southern border; taking troops from these areas would leave the Chi-
nese vulnerable where they can least afford it. Taiwan is less of an 
irritant to the PRC than the Soviet Union and Vietnam; 4) A PRC 
attack on Taiwan would reverse the political gains made in the West 
by the current regime and jeopardize continued US help for China's 
modernization 14; 5) The PRC has about 700,000 troops available in 
regions close to Taiwan. The Administration feels that although 
Taiwan has only 250,000 troops (excluding the offshore islands), the 
superior quality of the ROC forces would inflict enough damage on 
the PLAto make the venture too costly to undertake. To ensure the 
continued quality of Taiwan's forces the Administration planned to 
continue to sell selected weapons to the island for defensive 
purposes. 
In addition to these preclusions of force the Administration be-
13. "Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the 
United States of America and the People's Republic", in Downen, p. 51. 
14. U.S. Congress, Senate, Taiwan Enabling Act: Report of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, United States Senate, S245, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 1979. 
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lieved that other alternatives had a substantial enough drawback 
that the PRC would forego hostilities. For instance, an economic 
boycott could be instituted by simply declaring that the PRC will not 
do business with countries trading with Taiwan. This could backfire 
on Peking, since some countries have more trade with Taiwan than 
the Mainland and would be compelled. to sever trade relations with 
the lesser supplier or market. 15 
A more forceful approach would be for the PRC to institute a 
military blockade of Taiwan. Countries which accept the PRC as-
sertion that Taiwan is part of China would adhere to the blockade. 
The problems for Peking here is that most of Taiwan's trade is 
shipped in foreign vessels and Peking does not wish to interfere with 
Western shipping. 16 The Administration asserted that any PRC 
blockade would be a breach of the normalization agreement and the 
United States would therefore not honor itP 
From an American defense standpoint, the new approach to 
Taiwan security, as proposed by the Administration, would be one of 
"escalated response". 18 If Taiwan were to be attacked, the United 
States would escalate its response as aggression against Taiwan esca-
lated. We would, in other words, match tit for tat. In proposing this 
arrangement the Administration was replacing our previous policy 
of deterrence with a policy that would require Taiwan to face the 
risk of external assault before a US response could be formulated. 
With regard to US security interests in Taiwan, the Administra-
tion's reasoning was that, as articulated by Defense Secretary Brown, 
"we now confront an Asia much less menacing than it appeared-
and was - in the 1950s. when the Russians and Chinese acted in 
concert." 19 In this view, Taiwan is no longer necessary to the Ameri-
can posture in the region. Deputy Defense Secretary Charles 
Duncan further enunciated the Administration's new strategic view 
of Taiwan: 
At present our principle security concerns in Northeast 
Asia are the gradual buildup of Soviet military power and 
IS. Ibid 
16. Ibid 
17. U.S. Congress, House, Taiwan Legislation, Hearings Bifore the Committee on For-
eign A./fairs, United States House of Representatives, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 1978, p. 17. 
18. Ying-mao Kau, ''The Security of Taiwan: An Evaluation of the Carter Ap-
proach", in U.S. Congress, Senate, Taiwan: One Year After United States-China Normali-
zation, A Workshop Sponsored by the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States 
Senate, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1980, p. 127. 
19. Taiwan Enabling Act, p. 12. 
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the residual danger of conflict on the Korean penninsula. 
In Southeast Asia, we are concerned about developments in 
Indochina and Vietnam's close association with the USSR, 
which could lead to the establishment of bases there. US 
forces on Taiwan would not be well positioned to counter 
these components of the Soviet threat in Asia. While US 
bases on Taiwan could be useful for logistics support and 
refueling purposes, they are certainly not essential for the 
successful defense of South Korea.20 
7 
Secretary Duncan went on to cite Administration plans to strengthen 
our military deployments in the Western Pacific. Older destroyers 
will be replaced by newer, more powerful ones. Plans provide for 
the large deck carriers to be carrying F-14s and E3 AWACS and for 
updating Air Force material in the Western Pacific. The Adminis-
tration was also counting on increased ability to inject ground forces 
into the theatre as we improved our airlift capabilities.21 
It is clear from all this that the Administration gave extensive 
thought to our strategic interests in Taiwan. The Carter strategy was 
to compensate for the loss of military bases on Taiwan by strength-
ening our mobile forces in the area. In weighing our interests in 
Taiwan against the perceived benefits of normalization, President 
Carter came to the conclusion that we could strategically survive 
without Taiwan. There is no reason to doubt any of the Administra-
tion's calculus here. The projected improvements in our Pacific 
force more than compensate for the withdrawal of our military pres-
ence from Taiwan. But strategic considerations should not be the 
only criteria in such decisions. President Carter failed to understand 
that the derecognition of Taiwan and the termination of the defense 
treaty would inevitably raise serious doubts about the credibility of 
American defense commitments. 
Shortcomings of the Carter Strategy 
World Opinion 
In addressing the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Deputy 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher asserted that "the world-
wide, virtual unanimous reaction has been to applaud our normali-
zation of relations with the People's Republic of China.22" But Rep-
resentative Mica had very different impressions from our allies: 
20. Ibid., pp. 12, 13. 
21. Ibid., pp. 13, 14. 
22. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, p. 18. 
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"This Committee just last week had the opportunity of hosting mem-
bers of the European Parliament and it was near unanimous that this 
action (derecognition of Taiwan and termination of the Mutual De-
fense Treaty) had brought great disgust in Europe and further 
pointed out the distrust for the American people.'m Besides disap-
proving of our treatment of Taiwan, our European allies worried 
that the Soviet Union might try to compensate for US-China rap-
proachment by bolstering its European defenses. 
In the Asia-Pacific region the Carter Administration's treatment 
of Taiwan met with something less than enthusiasm. While it eased 
Japan's precarious positioning between Peking and Washington, not 
everyone in Japan applauded the move. An editorial in the Japan 
Times stated: 
[The United States] chose to abrogate its security 
treaty with Taiwan. Although it is the first of more than 
forty postwar pacts of a similar nature the US has aban-
doned in peacetime, it does raise serious questions of 
American credibility, especially with its allies in this part of 
the world ... 
The American break with Taiwan has other ramifica-
tions in raising doubts among US allies whether they too 
might become expendable in the future. Despite strong 
and repeated denials by American officials, the impression 
remains that the US is gradually retreating from the East 
A . . 24 sta regiOn ... 
Phillipine Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo said that the US 
termination of the defense treaty with Taiwan would further cast 
doubt on the credibility of US commitments to its allies.25 Israel, 
too, was said to have been concerned by the ease with which the US 
abandoned Taiwan. If the United States could drop Taiwan, with 
whom it had a treaty, how much easier would it be for it to drop 
Israel, a country with whom it has no treaty?26 
Nor did abandoning Taiwan meet with much fanfare at home. 
A New York Times-CBS poll, taken the weekend after the normali-
zation announcement, found that Americans disapproved of closer 
ties with China at the expense of Taiwan by 45% to 27%. Another 
New York Times-CBS poll taken January 23 to 26, 1979, found that 
23. Ibid, pp. 20, 21. 
24. Chiu, pp. 196, 197. 
25. Ibid, 197. 
26. Ibid 
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a majority of Americans still opposed normalization at Taiwan's ex-
pense.27 American disapproval was summed up in the Wall Street 
Journal: 
US acceptance of Peking's claim to rule over Taiwan is no 
mere confirmation of a 'simple reality', as President Carter 
described it ... In trying to minimize the importance of 
what the US has surrendered for a remarkably low price, 
the President has aggravated the damage the agreement it-
self has done to the political credibility of this administra-
tion ... 
In return for this recognition (of implicit PRC sover-
eignty over Taiwan) and withdrawal of the US military al-
liance with Taiwan, the US has received . . . a statement 
that Peking has not contradicted US insistence that reunifi-
cation not be attempted by force. It will be argued by the 
Administration that Peking can go no further without los-
ing face . . . Perhaps so, but the concern for Chinese face 
betrays a certain lack of concern for US or Taiwanese face. 
To whatever degree the charges of a US 'sellout' have 
meaning in Asia and the world, it will be another in a series 
of signals that the US has become an unreliable ally in fac-
ing up to pressure from politically determined Communist 
nations. Face indeed is important in politics. It is the task 
of US administrations to worry about US face. 28 
The reaction from the Soviet Union, over whom normalization 
was supposed to gain leverage, was not what the Administration was 
hoping for. After the announcement of US-PRC normalization, the 
Soviets quietly cancelled the SALT talks, increased their press at-
tacks on China, and apparently urged Vietnam to_ launch a large 
scale invasion of Cambodia to eliminate Chinese influence there.29 
The immediate domestic and international reaction was far 
from the unanimous approval cited by Deputy Secretary of State 
Christopher, nor did US-China normalization have the desired effect 
on the Soviets. Although many of those countries that disapproved 
of the Carter move had diplomatic relations with Peking at the ex-
pense of Taipei, none of them had to terminate a security agreement 
with Taiwan in order to open relations with the PRC. 
27. Ibid., p. 196. 
28. Ibid., p. 195. 
29. Ibid., p. 197. 
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Long-Term Implications 
Besides the immediate political repercussions, there are long 
term problems which must be considered. In reaching the decision 
to terminate our Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan, the Carter 
Administration considered Taiwan's strategic relevance to the 
United States; but Taiwan's real importance (aside from ideological 
or moral considerations) is political. If Taiwan were forcefully re-
united with the mainland, in disregard of US expectations that the 
matter be settled peacefully, the blow dealt to our international pres-
tige would be severe. First of all, it could only strengthen the deter-
mination of our adversaries in the region, who would feel the US 
lacks the will to enforce its commitments. Second, it would shake 
the foundation of faith and reliance upon which our security ar-
rangements are based, having a disintegrative effect on our regional 
commitments. With no other option open to them, countries once 
friendly to the United States might seek to improve their relations 
with China or the Soviet Union or simply be more susceptible to 
their pressures. 
In the Foreign Relations Committee report on normalization, 
Senator Helms relates a newspaper story of an ambassador from one 
of the states bordering the Indian Ocean littoral that had asked to be 
moved to Moscow because "that's where the power is."30 This shows 
that US credibility as a world power is already eroding. The ques-
tion to raise is how much more severe would that erosion be if China 
forcefully reunited Taiwan? One of the primary interests Third 
World countries have in either of the two superpowers is security 
protection. Those countries that do not feel they can rely on the 
United States to protect them from external aggression or Soviet-or-
Chinese-inspired internal subversion would be unwilling to incur the 
wrath of either Peking or Moscow and would find it necessary to 
distance themselves from the US. While the fall of Taiwan would 
not necessarily usher in the collapse of other countries in the area, it 
would cause any government that relies on the United States for its 
protection to worry. Our allies and friends would trickle away one 
by one as they could no longer rely on us. It is essential for this 
political reason that the US should have made clear its continued 
commitment to Taiwan. Taiwan may not be at this time of strategic 
importance to us, but its loss would be of serious political concern. 
In the final analysis, political losses (or "disaffections") add up to 
strategic losses. In President Carter's eagerness to play the "China 
30. Taiwan Enabling Act, pp. 54, 55. 
TAIWAN'S SECURITY AND U.S. POLICY 11 
card", he failed to reasonably assess the possible costs that jeopardiz-
ing Taiwan could incur. 
Bargaining Failures 
In early 1978, it began to appear that a stalemate in negotiations 
might stall the momentum of normalization. 31 Memories of the 
failed Vance mission to Peking in August, 1977 may have strength-
ened the notion at the White House that China would not budge on 
the Taiwan issue. The Carter policy toward the Soviet Union was 
making it imperative that the President be able to use the China card 
against Moscow. The Administration had been unable to deal with 
Russian and Cuban adventurism in Africa or to make headway on 
the SALT negotiations. In order to induce the Soviets to be more. 
cooperative it was felt that some leverage was needed, i.e., the 
"China card". But to secure this option it was necessary that the 
Administration relax its insistence on Taiwan's security. So in his 
negotiations with Peking, Ambassador Woodcock did not even 
broach the subject of a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan issue. 
During the Foreign Relations Committee hearings on normali-
zation, Chairman Church asked Ambassador Woodcock, "(a)t any 
time during the negotiations ... was the matter of an express com-
mitment by Peking against the use of force in settling the Taiwan 
issue posed?" To which Mr. Woodcock replied, "Not by me, Sir. 
No.'m Since the Ambassador was the chief party negotiating for the 
United States, no one else could have raised the issue. This question 
was also asked of Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher 
during the House Foreign Affairs Committee hearings. His response 
was that ''we had been pressing for their (PRC) willingness not to 
contradict our statement that we felt that the issue regarding Taiwan 
should be settled peacefully. And it was in this period (mid-Decem-
ber) that they finally indicated a willingness that we could make such 
a statement and they would not contradict it."33 Representative 
Mica asked Mr. Christopher if there was a "written response to this 
initiative?" Mr. Christopher responded that ''this was a negotiation 
of a diplomatic character that took place between Ambassador 
Woodcock in Peking and his counterpart there.''34 On the issue of 
arms sales to Taiwan after normalization, Mr. Christopher said that 
"we had been pressing for the ability to make sales of defense arma-
31. Kau, p. 130. 
32. Taiwan Enabling Act, p. 51. 
33. Hearing Before the Committee of Foreign Affairs, p. 15. 
34. Ibid. , p. 21. 
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ments to Taiwan in the postnormalization period after the Mutual 
Defense Treaty would have expired. This was a very contentious 
issue and it was only on the 14th of December that our position . . . 
was finally recognized by the People's Republic of China."35 There 
was no Chinese acquiesence here, only a recognition of our position. 
Time has shown that the issue of arms sales to Taiwan has remained 
a contentious one. 
A close look at the "concessions" made by Peking shows that 
they are not concessions at all. First, Leonard Woodcock did not 
even put forth the heretofore American position that the Taiwan is-
sue must be settled peacefully. When Secretary of State Vance made 
his trip to Peking and referred to this same issue, the Chinese be-
came emotional and declared that the Vance mission had actually 
damaged US-China relations. The Carter Administration, stung 
once, was not willing to let this happen again. Instead, they settled 
for getting Peking's permission to issue a unilateral statement expres-
sing US concern that the Taiwan issue be settled peacefully. But 
private Chinese assurances that we could issue such a statement 
without PRC contradiction proved to be fallacious. Immediately af-
ter normalization, the Chinese repeatedly stated that the manner in 
which China reunited Taiwan with the motherland was strictly an 
internal affair with which no country had a right to interfere. And 
on the issue of arms sales to Taiwan, Hua Kuo-feng, at his press 
conference announcing US-China normalization, called these 
"strictly not acceptable". In return for terminating our Mutual De-
fense Treaty with Taiwan, we received no Chinese pledge against 
force, and we were publicly contradicted on both the peaceful solu-
tion and arms issues. Regardless of what private assurances Ameri-
can negotiators may have received from the Chinese, in the event of 
a future Sino-American conflict over Taiwan, the balance of the le-
gal argument would clearly favor the PRC. 
Teng himself said China is in no hurry to reunify Taiwan with 
the mainland. The Chinese can and will wait 10, 15, 20 years to 
retake Taiwan. The current leaders in Peking are willing to lay the 
groundwork now for a course of action to be taken in the future. 
This is why they were willing to wait for favorable normalization 
terms before settling down to negotiations. It was only a matter of 
time before Chinese patience won out and an American president 
would loosen our commitment to Taiwan. While this did not imme-
diately deliver Taiwan back to the motherland, it was a move in the 
35. Ibid 
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right direction. As the Chinese saying goes, "a journey of a 
thousand li begins with one step." 
On the other hand, President Carter rushed the normalization 
negotiations with Mainland China in order to gain immediate lever-
age over the USSR. But had the Administration been more re-
served, it probably could have received a better deal from Peking. 
As Senator Helms pointed out during the Congressional hearings, 
China needs us more than we need them. We do not have to rely on 
normalized relations with Peking to convince China to hold the So-
viets in check. The Chinese loathe the Russians and will serve as an 
irritant to them whether we have formal relations with Peking or not. 
Had the Carter Administration gone into negotiations with China in 
a stronger stance, and not been so eager to consummate a deal, Tai-
wan's security could have been more assured from the start. The 
Administration badly wanted to play the China card against the So-
viet Union, and so backed itself into a comer on the Taiwan issue. 
The sense of urgency with which the Administration approached 
normalization put it in a subservient bargaining position from the 
beginning and has allowed the PRC to portray the United States as a 
"world wide eunich" unwilling to stand up for its principles.36 
Another flaw in the Administration's bargaining approach was 
the intentional use of ambiguous wording in the normalization 
agreement with Peking. The Joint Communique stated that the 
"Government of the United States acknowledges the Chinese posi-
tion that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China." The 
Administration contended that it was only taking note of Peking's 
position and not accepting it. But the PRC purposefully mistrans-
lated the word "acknowledge" as "cheng-jen" in the Chinese version 
of the Communique, which in English is more literally translated 
"recognizes". Because the US did not challenge this wording in the 
Chinese version it is now possible for the PRC to rely on its version 
of the Communique to claim the US had actually recognized its sov-
ereignty over Taiwan. 37 In an attempt to counter criticism, the Ad-
ministration said that the US adheres only to the English translation. 
This sort of intentional obfuscation may suffice under present 
circumstances, but in the future under different circumstances could 
be the cause of a US-China conflict. In order to avoid any such diffi-
culties each party's position should leave no room for interpretation 
36. James Lilly, "Security Considerations in Taiwan's Future", in Taiwan: One Year 
After United States-China Normalization, p. 138. 
37. Chiu, p. 185. 
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or interpolation by the other party. Given the ROC's popularity in 
the United States and considering the blow a PRC attack on Taiwan 
would deal US international credibility, we could not let aggression 
against Taiwan go unpunished. We would be forced into hostilities 
with the PRC. The Carter plan, while being ambiguous enough to 
give the PRC the idea that America is not fully committed to Tai-
wan's security, does not relieve the US of responsibility for the is-
lands' safety. 
The Problem of China's Leadership 
There are several questions which complicate the issue of nor-
malization and Taiwan's security. There is first the matter of how 
trustworthy the Chinese leadership is; a second is the question of the 
stability of the present regime; and, third, the dubious position held 
by the Carter Administration that the threat of withholding Western 
technology will deter Peking from assaulting Taiwan. 
Trustworthiness 
In normalizing relations with Peking President Carter was not 
only seeking the short term political gain of the China card, but was 
hoping to build a long term, mutually beneficial relationship with 
the People's Republic of China. But it is fairly certain that the Chi-
nese did not have these same intentions, since statements by Chinese 
leaders consistently referred to the short life expectancy of the new 
Sino-American relationship. In an address to the 11th National 
Party Congress, Hua Kuo-feng stated that although both superpow-
ers are "international exploiters and oppressors", the Soviet Union 
now presents China with the greatest danger since American imperi-
alism is on the wane. China would therefore exploit the "contradic-
tions" between the United States and the Soviet Union to its 
advantage by temporarily seeking US assistance to offset the threat 
from the north.38 Two days before the Vance trip the same Commu-
nist Party Congress called for the "broadest united front against the 
hegemonism of the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the 
United States."39 
Earlier, Keng Piao in his secret talk to the Chinese Politburo 
had said: "Just let the United States defend us against the influences 
38. Edwin K. Snyder, A. James Gregor, Maria Hsia Chang, The Taiwan Relations Act 
and the Defense of the Republic of China (Berkley: Institute of International Studies, 
University of California, 1980), p. 95. 
39. Downen, Taiwan Pawn in the China Game, p. 29. 
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of Soviet revisionism and guard the cost of the East China Sea so 
that we can have more strength to deal with the power in the north 
and engage in state construction. When the time is right, we will 
candidly say: 'please Uncle Sam, pack up your things and go'."40 
These and other duplicitous statements by high ranking Chinese offi-
cials make it clear that the Communists do not see the bright future 
for US-China relations that President Carter did. Such Chinese be-
havior illustrates the tenuousness of the new relationship. There still 
exist between the United States and the PRC deep economic, polit-
ical, and strategic differences which promise to someday rupture the 
entente that now exists. When this breakdown does occur we can be 
certain that the Communist Chinese will become more aggressive on 
the Taiwan issue. 
Stability 
Another weakness of the Carter strategy is the stability of the 
current government in Peking. Should the Four Modernizations fail 
and China's economy suffer serious problems, the moderates now in 
power would most likely be purged and replaced by Maoist person-
alties.41 A leftist leadership on the mainland would be less tolerant 
of Taiwan and less concerned about US sensibilities. A return to the 
radicalism of the Mao era, combined with the weakening of Tai-
wan's defenses, would place Taiwan in a precarious position. 
Even ifTeng's program is moderately successful, he will have to 
ensure a "pragmatist" line of succession. Many of the Chinese bu-
reaucrats now in office are there by the graces of Mao Tse-tung and 
are not supporters of Teng's policies. It will be necessary for a strong 
leadership to follow Teng in order to ensure a softer line on Taiwan. 
This will require routing Maoists out of the bureaucracy, particularly 
the People's Liberation Army. 
There is also the question of "gerentocracy". Teng and all his 
senior colleagues are in their seventies and have little time left to put 
China on a "moderate" path. Although Teng is now grooming his 
successors to take the reins of power, there is no assurance that they 
will be able to repel leftist encroachment, or that faced with eco-
nomic crisis would not themselves adopt a more radical approach. 
China's political life over the past three decades has displayed a con-
sistent pendulum swing between leftist and rightist "deviation" every 
40. Chiu, p. 194. 
41. Kau, p. 128. 
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few years.42 Given the instability that appears almost endemic to the 
Chinese Communist system it is safe to assume that it is only a mat-
ter of time before leftists return to power. 
The "Trade Carrot" 
Teng's "Four Modernizations" program is reliant on technolog-
ical modernization. More and more of this technology comes from 
Japan and the US, the countries that have shown the greatest con-
cern over Taiwan's future. Any PRC attack against Taiwan would 
supposedly jeop·ardize China's access to this valuable trade and 
destabilize the modernization program that keeps Teng in power. 
But there is no reason to believe that an economic dependence on 
and friendship with Japan and the US would prevent China from 
attacking Taiwan. As Edwin Snyder has pointed out, the Commu-
nist Chinese were prepared to undercut their relationship with the 
Soviet Union, upon whom they depended so heavily, partly because 
of the Russian failure to support them on the Taiwan issue.43 It is 
doubtful that Japan and the US can hold any more sway over the 
Chinese than did the Russians. 
There is also the issue of allied support. If the PRC ever attacks 
Taiwan, could we be sure that our allies would join in trade sanc-
tions? Their failures in this respect during both the Iranian and Po-
lish crises do not leave one with a great sense of faith in their 
cooperation. It does not seem likely that either Japan or or Euro-
pean allies would join us in sanctions against China if it attacks Tai-
wan. US sanctions alone would be worthless. 
This aside, China is not entirely reliant on the West for technol-
ogy. Even today the PRC trades with the USSR and the East bloc 
countries.44 The fact that China has diversified it's trading partners 
limits its liability in the event of a technological embargo by the 
West. Furthermore, the degree of China's new technological reli-
ance on the West and Japan is not as substantial as it is made to 
seem. Although China has paid great lip service to its military 
"shopping sprees" it is really quite cautious in the way it spends it's 
money. The PRC military budget is currently only $11 billion and 
has been cut twice in the last two years, most recently by twenty two 
percent. So, out of necessity the Chinese are limited as to what they 
can buy. The PRC, it has been said, is interested in buying "one of 
42. Ibid p. 132. 
43. Snyder, pp. 32, 33. 
44. Kau, p. 132. 
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this and one of that". This strategy enables them to copy and build 
on foreign technology and avoid developing a dependence on for-
eign sources of technology. 
In recent years, technical institutions on the mainland have 
flourished and the number of Chinese students studying abroad has 
greatly increased. It will not be long before China has a technologi-
cal infrastructure capable of producing the hardware it now must 
import. So, holding out Western trade - particularly technology -
may work in the short run but is of doubtful utility in the long run. 
Another problem with using the "trade carrot" is that once the 
Chinese economy is invigorated the potential market for Western 
goods could grow appreciably. As this market grows, so too does 
American reliance on the market.45 It is possible that eventually 
Mainland China could be a more substantial US trading partner 
than Taiwan (at present, our eighth largest). Future administrations 
would take into account the loss in trade that would occur if the US 
were to embargo China in the event of a PRC attack on Taiwan. 
Encouraging US-PRC trade, then, may inflate the mainland's impor-
tance to the United States and, conversely, reduce Taiwan's 
importance. 
Taiwan's Defense 
The Issue of Deterrence 
The most essential aspect of Taiwan's relationship with the 
United States was its deterrent effect vis-a-vis the mainland. Up un-
til December, 1978 Peking had to worry that its agression against 
Taiwan would be met with American military retaliation. But the 
severance of US-ROC diplomatic relations, the termination of the 
1954 Mutual Defense Treaty, the withdrawal of remaining US 
troops from Taiwan, and the one year moratorium imposed on US 
arms sales to Taiwan all seriously undermined the deterrence the 
ROC had maintained against the mainland. 
Deterrence involves manipulating an opponent's behavior b4 
employing the threat of force as a response to his first use of force. 6 
For some opponents fear is the key element. For others it is a ra-
tional assessment of costs and gains. And for still others uncertainty 
and risk are important elements.47 As will be shown in the section 
45. Ibid. 
46. Patrick A. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis, (Beverly Hills and 
London: Sage, 1977), p. 9. 
47. Ibid., p. 22. 
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on military comparison, the only deterrence now employable by the 
ROC is that of costs and gains: the mainland might be able to sub-
due Taiwan but only at a prohibitive cost. Prior to December, 1978 
Taiwan also employed the deterrence of fear over the mainland. The 
1954 Defense Treaty and American troops stationed on the island 
signalled to Peking that the United States was willing to come to 
Taiwan's defense. The PRC had to seriously consider that an attack 
against Taiwan would not only be costly in terms of personnel and 
equipment, but that it would be fruitless and possibly even counter-
productive. As Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan point out, de-
terrence is substantially more successful when the defender and the 
defended have a treaty (as opposed to some lesser commitment).48 
When President Carter severed diplomatic relations and terminated 
the defense treaty with Taipei, he removed the deterrent of Ameri-
can retaliation as a response to PRC aggression against Taiwan. 
Here a distinction must be drawn between "general deterrence" 
and "immediate deterrence".49 The latter concerns the relationship 
between opposing states where one side is considering attack while 
the other is mounting a threat of retaliation in an effort to prevent 
it.50 Immediate deterrence, then, is designed to forestall an (in most 
cases) impending attack. On the other hand, a general deterrence 
concerns opponents who maintain armed forces to regulate their re-
lationship, although neither is planning an attack.51 General deter-
rence is constantly in place and designed with the recognition that an 
attack by the opponent might one day occur, this awareness is cou-
pled with the desire to make the necessary military preparations for 
immediate deterrence at that time. 52 General deterrence is practiced 
in the hope of avoiding immediate deterrence. With the exception of 
the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958, it was a general deterrence that the 
US-ROC relationship had established over the PRC.53 
In the US-PRC normalization announcement, President Carter 
carefully avoided tying Taiwan's security to United States security 
interests. The Carter Administration had replaced the explicit assur-
ance of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the calculated ambiguity of 
48. Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without War, (Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings, 1978), p. 114. 
49. Morgan, p. 28. 
50. Ihid 
51. Ihid, p. 38. 
52. I hid, p. 42. 
53. See Article 5, paragraph I, of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty between the 
United States and Republic of China cited in note 54 infra with accompanying text. 
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the normalization announcement. In 1954 the United States and the 
ROC agreed that "(e)ach Party recognizes that an armed attack in 
the West Pacific Area directed against the territories of either of the 
Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares 
that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its 
constitutional processes. "54 This very clearly laid down the military 
and defense aspect of the US relationship with Taiwan. But in 1978, 
this commitment was replaced by vague statements regarding our 
expectation and interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan is-
sue. When the PRC contradicted the Administration as to the 
method of reunification, the President did not clarify or redefine his 
position. The idea that the President's non-commital statements 
would provide any deterrent effect upon the PRC is unsubstantiated. 
Commitments must be clearly stated and appropriately signalled to 
the potential aggressor. When asked if the US had any particular 
contingencies in the event of a PRC attack on Taiwan, Deputy Sec-
retary of State Christopher was unable to present any but merely 
said that an attack on Taiwan was "extremely unlikely". 55 This type 
of behavior is a textbook case of future deterrence failure. Alexan-
der George and Richard Smoke point out that in cases like this the 
defender has employed signals to convey his commitment that are 
overly general, incomplete, misleading, or in some way inadequate. 56 
The Carter Administration did not adequately signal to the Commu-
nist Chinese the extent of the American commitment to Taiwan. In 
fact, the Carter Administration consistently failed to make clear to 
Peking the extent to which Taiwan's security is a concern to the 
United States. It had instead tried to distance itself from Taiwan. It 
has been pointed out that a sophisticated opponent will judge the 
extent of a commitment by analyzing the defender's fundamental in-
terests (i.e., strategic, political, economic, and ideological) in the 
country in question and thereby determine the nature and magni-
tude of that commitment. Rhetoric and other signaling devices the 
defender may employ will not have much credibility in the oppo-
nent's analysis.57 The Carter Administration, however, did not even 
attempt to establish a rhetorical commitment to Taiwan. Adminis-
trative bargaining behavior and normalization concessions to Peking 
54. Article 5, paragraph l, of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty between the United 
States and the Republic of China. · 
55. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, p. 130. 
56. Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: 
Theory and Practice (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 562. 
57. George and Smoke, pp. 560, 561. 
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gave the impression that the US was disengaging its strategic and 
political interests in Taiwan. In the future, this perception on the 
part of mainland authorities could provide the basis for a calculus of 
attack. Such an attack would almost necessarily bring the US and 
China into confrontation because it is the sense of the American peo-
ple and the Congress that we remain committed to the defense of 
Taiwan.* 
For deterrence and signaling to be effective, it is important that 
United States interests be clearly involved in the country in ques-
tion.58 In reality, US strategic, political, and economic interests are 
linked to the security of Taiwan. For the United States to sit by 
passively while the PRC forcefully takes over the islands would be 
tantamount to American divestment of its international defense 
commitments, because one's behavior in a particular situation will 
effect the way one is perceived by future opponents as well as current 
opponents and allies. The details of a particular situation are less 
important that the fact that one's reputation is on the line.59 It has 
already been shown that the termination of the Mutual Defense 
Treaty caused our allies in the region to doubt the credibility of our 
commitments. However, if the PRC ever successfully undermined 
any aspect of our security network (i.e., Taiwan), the rest of it could 
disintegrate very quickly. Edwin Snyder has written that "(a)t the 
moment, the Japanese are attempting to maintain a balance between 
Communist China and the United States. Should the PRC accede to 
the control of Taiwan, the result could only be a decided Japanese 
tilt toward the PRC. In the past, Japanese - American relations 
have always been perceived as the axis for stability in the Pacific. A 
significant Japanese tilt toward the PRC would signal a change for 
all the nations in the region. In such an environment the PRC would 
enjoy increased political and diplomatic leverage - not necessarily 
to the advantage of the United States."60 
Summation 
Expressions of Presidential concerns and ambiguous policies 
with regard to Taiwan's security do not replace the modus operandi 
necessary for successful deterrence. What is essential is the success-
ful communication to any potential aggressor that there exists an ad-
• See sections on US public opinion and Congressional behavior. 
58. Ibid, p. 560. 
59. Morgan, p. 59. 
60. Snyder, p. 93. 
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equate deterrence commitment.61 An effective deterrent must be in 
place, be easily employed62, and applicable to the specific level and 
type of aggression.63 A posture of general deterrence requires a state 
to have either a substantial commitment from a defending power or 
sufficient armed forces to defend itself.64 Either the United States 
must clearly enunciate a commitment to Taiwan's security, or it must 
see to it that Taiwan's military is adequately equipped. Since Presi-
dent Carter has discontinued the direct application of American 
force for ROC security, the United States is obliged to see that Tai-
wan has access to the defensive arms it requires. 
ROC-PRC Military Comparison 
Currently, the PRC armed forces number about 3.9 million 
ground forces, 490,000 air force personnel, and a navy of about 
360,000.65 The People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has 
approximately 4500 fighter-interceptor aircraft of the MiG 17 and 
MiG 19 varieties.66 The Chinese navy has about 500 regular naval 
craft capable of serving in a sealift capacity and 700 other coastal 
vessels that can be used for "boatpack" waves of amphibious 
assault.67 
Taiwan, by contrast, has 250,000 troops (excluding the offshore 
islands). The Republic of China Air Command (ROCAC) deploys 
about 316 combat aircraft: 90 FIOOA/E (Sabre) and 165 F5A/E (Ti-
ger) aircraft, three interceptor squadrons with 44 F104G (Starfighter) 
aircraft, 8 F104G for reconaissence, 9 S2A/E (Tracker) for rescue 
and anti-submarine functions, and 120 helicopters.68 In all, the PRC 
enjoys a 10 to 1 superiority over the ROC in terms of personnel and 
all categories of major military equipment.69 The PRC has the larg-
est land army and the third largest airforce in the world. 70 
But there are constraints on the PLA preventing it from attack-
ing Taiwan. Although it has sea vessels capable of amphibious func-
tions, they would probably not be able to cross the turbulent waters 
61. George and Smoke, p. 562. 
62. Morgan, p. 40. 
63. George and Smoke, p. 562. 
64. Morgan, p. 40. 
65. Snyder, p. 27. 
66. Ibid, p. 26. 
67. Ibid, p. 27. 
68. Ibid, p. 26. 
69. Ibid 
70. Ibid 
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of the Taiwan Strait without sustaining great losses. Those troops 
that make it to Taiwan's-west coast would be met with heavy artil-
lery and gunfire. Again, the losses would be substantial. Second, the 
PRC may have a numerically superior airforce but not one that is 
qualitatively superior. The MiGs flown by the PLAAF are models 
of 15-year old American and Russian aircraft and would not fare 
well against the more modem ROCAC craft. The only figures avail-
able (from 1958) show a ROCAC/PLAAF air kill ratio of 15.5 to 
1.71 Further, medium and light bombers attacking Taiwan at me-
dium and high altitudes would suffer serious attrition due to ROC 
anti-aircraft measures. 72 Also, the PLA is planning a reduction in 
force of about 800,000, or approximately 15% of their total troop 
strength. It is unlikely that the PLA would reduce force levels along 
its northern or southern borders, so the cuts would have to come 
from the interior and coastal military sectors. The PRC has about 
700,000 troops in military districts near Taiwan which could possibly 
be affected by a force reduction. 
Even with the PRC's military constraints, it still poses a very 
real threat to Taiwan's security. In 1979, Vice Admiral Edwin Sny-
der concluded that despite its shortcomings, and disregarding the 
high price it would pay in men and materiel, the PLA could neutral-
ize Taiwan's airforce in two to three weeks.73 The elimination of 
ROCAC would enable the PLAAF to cripple the island's defense 
against landing forces by enabling it to concentrate on Taiwan's 
shore defenses. The mainland airforce would still have to face ROC 
surface to air missiles, but these would pose less of a problem than 
ROCAC's air superiority. 
A calculation of PRC/ROC military capabilities must be done 
with a future time frame in mind. The mainland has reduced its 
defense spending twice in the past two years and has been concen-
trating on economic development. The idea behind this strategy is 
that only after China has developed a strong industrial infrastructure 
can there be adequate modernization of the PLA. The current plan 
calls for emphasis on agriculture and light industry, which in tum 
will lay the base for development of heavy industry.74 A sound in-
dustrial infrastructure would be capable of sustaining a military in-
dustrial complex large enough to supply the PLA. The long term 
71. Ibid, p. 27. 
72. Ibid, p. 29. 
73. Taiwan Enabling Act, Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations. 
74. Xia Zhen, "A New Economic Strategy for Economic Development," Beijing Re-
view (August 10, 1981). 
TAIWAN'S SECURITY AND U.S. POLICY 23 
effects of this strategy are given added dimension when coupled with 
the new American, Japanese, and European attitude toward selling 
the PRC technology with military applications as well as military 
equipment. Currently, Rolls Royce is co-producing Spey jet engines 
with the Chinese and an American firm is selling the PRC Cyber 
computers with missile applications. The real threat to Taiwan's se-
curity, then, will not come in a year or two, but some time in the 
future when the mainland can adequately arm the PLA for a suc-
cessful offensive against the island. There is no definite time-frame 
for this, but it has been su9gested that the PRC could achieve this 
capability by 1985 or 1987. 5 
At present, Taiwan's defenses are capable of inflicting severe 
enough damage on the PLA to deter an attack, but this deterrence 
capability must be maintained in order to avoid a future ROC/PRC 
conflict. With each substantial improvement in the PLA there must 
be a corresponding improvement in Taiwan's military. The United 
States has supplied over ninety-five per cent of Taiwan's military 
equipment, and an adverse change in this relationship would require 
ROC forces to reequip at great time and expense.7 It is therefore 
incumbent upon the US to see that Taiwan has an adequate defense 
capability. Should America fail to properly supply Taiwan's mili-
tary the ROC could be forced to do business with countries hostile to 
the United States, most notably the Soviet Union. Taiwan would of 
necessity have to seek arms from outside sources since it could not 
divert funds to develop the necessary military industrial complex 
without harming its continued economic prosperity. 
The Carter Administration had not done well in the area of 
arms sales to Taiwan. Immediately following US-PRC normaliza-
tion President Carter imposed a one year moratorium on arms sales 
to Taiwan, thereby creating a gap in ROC defense planning that will 
add to its difficulty in keping ahead of the mainland. In addition, 
when the State Department finally made up its mind about what 
type of aircraft Taiwan could purchase, it restricted the sales to the 
F-5E and prohibited the sale of the more advanced F-4, F-16, and F-
18 fighters.77 The effect of President Carter's behavior is psychologi-
cally and politically damaging for Taiwan. The fact that the Admin-
istration acquiesced on this issue showed Taiwan and all America's 
Asia-Pacific allies the lengths it was willing to go to in order to 
75. Allen Whiting, "Taiwan's Security Prospects", in Taiwan: One Year After United 
States-China Normalization, p. 151. 
76. Kau, p. 133. 
77. Downen, Taiwan Pawn in the China Game, p. 36. 
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please Communist China. It also casts doubts over the availability 
of future arms sales to Taiwan. IfUS-PRC relations were to become 
especially close the Carter Administration or its successors might be 
reluctant to jeopardize the relationship by continuing arms sales to 
Taiwan. This would be particularly so if the United States at-
tempted a strategic relationship with the People's Republic against 
the Soviet Union. 
Insufficiently arming the ROC might initiate the process toward 
the development of nuclear capability on Taiwan.78 The ROC has 
been developing the technological capacity to produce missiles with 
a 960 kilometer range, capable of hitting Canton, Foochow, Shang-
hai, Nanking and other major industrial and population centers on 
the mainland.79 Furthermore, Taiwan has a ready supplier of nu-
clear fuel in South Africa. The presence of nuclear weapons on both 
sides of the Taiwan Strait would be destabilizing to the region and 
would make it difficult for the US to maintain its current leverage 
over Taipei.80 
CONGRESSIONAL BEHAVIOR 
Several issues shaped the atmosphere in which normalization 
and the Taiwan issue were debated in Congress. The secrecy of the 
negotiations between the Administration and the People's Republic 
of China, the weak US bargaining posture in negotiations on the 
Taiwan issue, and the Administration's failure to adequately state 
the continued American concern for Taiwan's safety were all factors 
contributing to the hostile reception the Administration's Taiwan 
legislation received on Capitol Hill. 
Secrecy of Negotiations 
Even before President Carter announced the normalization of 
US-China relations, Congress acted to ensure Taiwan's safety. On 
July 20, 1978, Senators Bob Dole (R Kansas) and Richard Stone (D 
Florida) along with 18 Senate cosponsors proposed an amendment 
78. Snyder, p. 88. 
79. James Hsiung, ''The Security of Taiwan and U.S. Policy", in Taiwan: One Year 
After United States-China Normalization, p. 126. 
80. Ibid. The "abandonment" of Taiwan has reduced US leverage over Taipei. 
Once, US agents literally walked into Chungshan Institute of Research and Technology 
and smashed its facilities suspected of having been used for developing nuclear weapons. 
Since the severance of diplomatic and defense relations with Taipei, the United States no 
longer has the "authority" to perpetrate this type of arrogant act. Future ROC nuclear 
research will not be as vulnerable to American pressure. 
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to the 1979 Security Assistance bill. The Dole-Stone Amendment 
required the Executive to confer with the Senate before it took any 
action effecting the continuation in force of the 1954 Mutual Defense 
Treaty. This amendment was unanimously adopted by a vote of 94 
to 0. 
The joint Senate-House committee changed the wording to in-
clude Congress as a whole in the consultation, rather than just the 
Senate. President Carter signed the bill into law on September 26, 
1978. It was then the sense of Congress that it was to be consulted 
before any change in our defense relationship with the Republic of 
China. 
Shortly after the passage of the Security Assistance Act, Senator 
Goldwater and twenty-four cosponsors proposed Senate Concurrent 
Resolution 109, which stated that "the President should not unilater-
ally take any action which has the effect of abrogation or otherwise 
affecting the validity (of the US-Taiwan and other defense treaties) 
without the advice and consent of the Senate, which was involved in 
initial ratification, or the approval of both Houses of Congress." 
This Resolution was submitted too late in the session for considera-
tion, but the large number of cosponsors - one fourth of the Senate 
-clearly shows the concern of many Senators that US defense com-
mitments, like the one with Taiwan, should not be determined solely 
by the President. 81 
Congress did get the prior consultation it demanded in the Se-
curity Assistance Act. Less than three hours before President Carter 
was to go on national television to announce the normalization of 
US-China relations, he summoned a handful of Congressmen to the 
White House to inform them of the news. Thus, Congress got its 
prior consultation and the President was in technical compliance 
with the 1979 Security Assistance Act. But the way in which consul-
tation was carried out - with no chance for Congress to consider the 
issue - was contradictory to the spirit of the Act. This approach 
engendered animosity on Capitol Hill. 
There are several reasons why the President did not confer with 
Congress before normalizing relations with the PRC. Mr. Carter 
had felt that open Congressional debate on US-China normalization 
might not only raise issues that would offend Communist Chinese 
sensibilities, but could jeopardize the goal of normalization. Con-
gress would have been adamant on the issue of Taiwan's security, 
and the President knew the Chinese would never accept Congres-
81. Downen, Taiwan Pawn in the China Game, p. 33. 
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sional terms for normalization. Also, open debate would have re-
moved the surprise element President Carter had hoped to use 
against the Soviets (i.e., shocking them into cooperation). Further-
more, President Carter had had prior consultation with Congress on 
the Panama Canal Treaties and found that it opened a Pandora's 
box of bargaining, politicking, and opposition, as well as raised the 
ire of Congressional conservatives. Determined to avoid a repeat of 
that experience, the President decided to limit his conferral with 
Congress on normalization and the Taiwan issue. 82 
It is standard procedure for the State Department to keep mem-
bers of the foreign relations committees abreast of developments in 
foreign policy, particularly if the administration is planning a major 
policy shift. The Carter Administration had been keeping relevant 
committee members informed for two years on US-China relations 
but had stopped the consultation sometime just prior to the normali-
zation breakthrough in mid-December of 1978. December is a 
month when members of Congress go home to do constituent work, 
and the Administration appears to have counted on this as an excuse 
to avoid consultation. But in December, 1978, the members of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee were in Washington, so the Presi-
dent could have - and in the eyes of Congress, should have·_ con-
sulted with these committee members before finally accepting 
Peking's conditions for normalization. 83 In fact, the Administration 
may have even attempted to deceive Congress on the state of the 
Sino-American talks. Clement Zablocki, Chairman of the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee, pointed out to Warren Christopher dur-
ing the committee hearings on normalization that when he last spoke 
to Secretary Vance, he was told the issue of normalization was "on a 
back burner". 84 It is clear from this that the President and the State 
Department had attempted to keep Congress in the dark. 
Senator Goldwater, angered by the President's fl.agrant disre-
gard of Congressional concern for Taiwan, said that "(w)hat the 
President did was bad enough. But the way he did it was even 
worse."85 President Carter had only given ROC President Chiang 
seven hours notice of the termination of diplomatic and security re-
lations between his country and the United States and gave Congress 
only three hours notice. Senator Goldwater and others felt that the 
82. Ibid., p. 29. 
83. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, pp. 19, 20. 
84. Ibid. 
85. United States Congressional Record (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
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President's move - aside from being ethically questionable - was 
unconstitutional and filed suit in the Supreme Court contesting the 
action. Their reasoning was that since a treaty requires Senate ap-
proval to be enacted, it must naturally take Senate approval to termi-
nate it. Other Senators and Representatives felt that President 
Carter was establishing a bad precedent. Recent years had seen 
presidents evading the "advise and consent" requirement by imple-
menting executive agreements, rather than treaties, with other coun-
tries. These agreements require no Senate approval. Now, in the 
opinion of some, the President was attempting to usurp more Con-
gressional power by taking it upon himself to terminate a treaty. 86 
In an effort to counter criticism of the administration, Senator 
Kennedy said he was "personally convinced that the President had. 
full authority to take the action he did ... 87 But it was Mr. Ken-
nedy whom the White House had chosen to test domestic receptivity 
to normalization. His approval in this matter, then, is not surprising. 
Senator Claiborne Pell took a more substantive look at the consulta-
tion issue and felt Senator Goldwater's assertions of executive un-
constitutionality were unfounded: "I am troubled by the arguments 
of some of my colleagues that since a treaty requires ratification to 
come into effect, an argument could be made that the same process 
would be required to terminate it. I did not find any reference . . . 
in the Federalist for such a conclusion."88 These observations were 
to be reiterated by the Supreme Court, which after hearing the case 
filed by Senator Goldwater, issued an opinion upholding the Presi-
dent's right to terminate treaties without Congressional approval. 
Reaction to Administration Bargaining Failures 
Among Republicans, the Administration's bargaining failures 
on the Taiwan issue with Peking were a particular irritant. Since the 
days of the Chinese revolution, the Nationalist government has en-
joyed strong support among Republicans. 89 The Truman Adminis-
tration had "lost China" to Communism, and now the Carter 
Administration was "abandoning Taiwan" without a fight. Republi-
cans in Congress were angered over the obsequious behavior of the 
86. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, p. 25. 
87. Congressional Record, p. S2596. 
88. U.S. Congress. Senate, Taiwan: Hearings Before the Commillee on Foreign Rela-
tions, 96th Cong., lst Session, p. 94. 
89. For discussions of Republican support for the Nationalist Chinese Government 
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American negotiating team and its failure to even broach the topic of 
a Chinese pledge not to use force to settle the Taiwan issue. Senator 
Humphrey of New Hampshire was perhaps the most outspoken of 
the Administration's critics in the Senate. Mr. Humphrey asked, 
"(w)ho made all the concessions? We did. I suggest that haste has 
botched up this thing. President Carter made a very poor deal, 
which stinks to high heavens."90 On the House side, Representative 
Goldwater was highly critical of the Administration's bargaining 
failures: "Why did the United States come out of the negotiations 
with nothing and the People's Republic of China with everything? 
... (China) wanted us to break the defense treaty- they got it. 
Red China wanted us to remove our troops (from Taiwan)- they 
got it."91 * 
In contrast, the Democrats were relatively silent on these issues. 
This was not a sign of lack of concern for Taiwan, but rather a show 
of solidarity with the President. The substantive issue of Taiwan's 
security could be dealt with in a more subdued fashion. The job of 
Congressional Democrats was to stave off Republican attempts to 
compromise the President's new China policy while instituting safe-
guards for Taiwan's security. 
The Substantive Issue of Taiwan's Security 
The prior consultation and negotiation issues on Taiwan's se-
curity were presented to Congress as faits accompli. It is impossible 
to say what security safeguards Congress would have insisted on had 
the President conferred with it before normalizing relations with the 
People's Republic of China. Instead, the Congress was presented 
with the President's withdrawal of the US security guarantee from 
Taiwan and had to construct a credible deterrence commitment to 
replace the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty. 
On January 26, 1979, the White House sent to Congress the Tai-
wan Omnibus Bill, which outlined our new relationship with Tai-
wan. Essentially, it was a copy of the Japanese formula: laws that 
apply to foreign nations would apply to Taiwan, US government 
employees could take "leaves of absence" to work at the "unofficial" 
American Institute in Taiwan without losing employment or retire-
ment benefits, and the Institute was to be under the jurisdiction of 
90. Congressional Record, p. S2567. 
91. Congressional Record, p. Hl284. 
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the Secretary of State. There was no mention of US concern for 
Taiwan security. The bill was purely administrative. The Adminis-
tration felt its expressed concern for Taiwan's security, coupled with 
the political and military constraints on the PRC, would be adequate 
to deter mainland aggression. 
Members of Congress were aware of the serious implications the 
President's sudden policy change had for our credibility as a defense 
partner. Senator DeConcini believed the President's behavior to-
ward Taiwan "denuded" United States' credibility, and felt it would 
invite our opponents to test our resolve. 92 Representative Rudd de-
clared that it was necessary for Congress to ensure continued US 
military and economic support for the Republic of China if the 
United States was to retain world-wide confidence in our commit-
ment to freedom. 93 Some in Congress felt that withdrawing our 
share of Taiwan's deterrence against the mainland might encourage 
the Communists to improve their armed forces and challenge the 
Republic of China.94 It was deemed important to maintain the mili-
tary status quo across the Taiwan Strait and see to it that Taiwan has 
an adequate defense capability.95 The subjugation of Taiwan would 
not only destabilize the region politically, it would jeopardize impor-
tant sea lanes and remove a vital link in the strategic island chain 
(i.e., Japan, Ruyuku, Taiwan, and the Phillipines) that hems in the 
Asiatic rimlands.96 
Congress did not agree with the President's approach to Tai-
wan's security and preferred to develop a policy based on clear de-
terrence. Members of Congress contended that unless our resolve 
and commitment were stated formally and explicitly, United States 
credibility would be doubted by adversaries and friends alike. 
Worse still, the ambiguity of American policy could prove to be fer-
tile ground for future PRC aggression against Taiwan. Senator 
DeConcini expressed the prevailing sentiment of the Senate when he 
said, "it is imperative that the US Congress clarify its resolve not to 
tolerate the use of force (against Taiwan), and to continue to honor, 
in essence, our commitment . . . "97 
There was no question in Congress that the United States 
needed to reinstate a deterrence commitment to Taiwan's security. 
92. Ibid 
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Initially, Senator Javits had submitted an amendment in the Foreign 
Relations Committee which stated that an attack on Taiwan would 
be "a common danger to the peace and security of the people of 
Taiwan and the United States in the Western Pacific." The original 
Javits amendment pledged US action to protect American interests 
in the region. Senator Church had initially posed no objections to 
this language but after talking with the President, concluded that it 
was unacceptable and suggested a revision that would not contradict 
the spirit of the new US-PRC arrangement. This revision was neces-
sitated by White House insistence that the President would veto any 
security language he deemed to be too strong.98 Essentially, the Ad-
ministration wanted to let Congress have its security clause for the 
Omnibus legislation, but the language could not commit the US to 
the degree the 1954 Defense Treaty had, nor could the bill pledge 
American intervention in a Taiwan-PRC conflict. 
It was necessary, then, to phrase American commitment in such 
a way that it did not directly link United States and Taiwan security. 
The final security clause came to be known as the Church-Javits 
Amendment and was actually a combination of House Foreign Af-
fairs Committee markup language and a softened version of the ini-
tial Javits Amendment. It stated concern for Taiwan's security but 
did so in a way that left US response flexible to any future aggres-
sion. The amendment, as it appeared in the Taiwan Relations Act 
stated: 
It is the policy of the United States-
(1) To preserve and promote extensive, close, and 
friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between 
the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan 
(2) To declare that peace and stability in the area are in 
the political, security, and economic interests of the United 
States, and are matters of international concern; 
(3) To make. clear that the United States decision to es-
tablish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of 
China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan 
will be determined by peaceful means; 
(4) To consider any effort to determine the future of Tai-
wan by other than peaceful means, including boycotts and 
embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the West-
em Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States; 
98. Downen, Taiwan Pawn in the China Game, pp. 44, 45. 
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(5) To provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive charac-
ter; and, 
{6) To maintain the capacity of the United States to resist 
any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would 
jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of 
the people of Taiwan. 
31 
This amendment covered the deterrence criteria established ear-
lier by setting out United States' economic, ideological, political, and 
strategic interests in Taiwan. It did not directly link Taiwan and 
United States security, as was stressed in the earlier Javits Amend-
ment, but stated that any resort to force against Taiwan would be of 
grave concern to the United States, and further stated that we retain 
the capacity to resist force or any forms of coercion applied against 
Taiwan. The amendment also pledged the United States to provide 
Taiwan with defensive arms. 
Since the Church-Javits Amendment was developed and ap-
proved in committee, it was easier for the Democratic majority to 
reject the more strongly worded security amendments. Other 
amendments were offered to enhance Taiwan's defenses and the of-
ficiality of its representation in the United States, such as the one 
submitted by Senator Percy which stated that "(i)t is the policy of the 
United States to consider any effort to resolve the Taiwan issue by 
other than peaceful means a threat to the peace and security of the 
Western Pacific and to the security of the United States." This 
amendment sought to actively link Taiwan and US security. As with 
the initial Javits Amendment, the Percy language was unacceptable 
to the President. The amendment was defeated by the efforts of Sen-
ator Church and the lobbying of Vice President Mondale and War-
ren Christopher. 99 The absence of this amendment was 
compensated for by Paragraphs 2 through 6 of Section Two of the 
final version of the bill. 
In the postnormalization period, the United States was to have 
relations with "the people on Taiwan." President Carter had insisted 
on this language because it signified the unofficial nature of the rela-
tionship. In response to this, Senator Stone offered an amendment 
defining the "people on Taiwan" as including ''the governing au-
thorities on Taiwan, recognized by the United States prior to Janu-
ary 1, 1979 as the Republic of China; its agencies, instrumentalities, 
and political subdivisions; and the people governed by it in the is-
lands of Taiwan and the Pescadores." The acceptance of this 
99. Ibid, p. 47. 
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amendment by the Foreign Relations Committee reinforced the le-
gitimacy of the Government of the Republic of China by acknowl-
edging its existence after US-PRC normalization. The officiality of 
the ROC Government was further strengthened by the Boren 
Amendment, which stipulated that the PRC could not take posses-
sion of ROC properties in the United States. 
Senator Hollings offered an amendment which stated that noth-
ing in the Taiwan Relations Act should "be construed as a basis for 
supporting the exclusion or expulsion of the people of Taiwan from 
continued membership in any international financial institution or 
any other international organization." This amendment secured US 
approval for Taiwan's participation in the activities of the World 
Bank and similar institutions that are vital to its economic well be-
ing. A concern of many Senators was that Taiwan might be eco-
nomically blackmailed by the PRC or countries doing business with 
the PRC. One form of this blackmail would be to cut Taiwan off 
from sources of loans which might be necessary to its economy. The 
Hollings Amendment made it clear that our new relationship with 
Taiwan should not be interpreted as an acceptance of such a situa-
tion. Furthermore, by allowing Taiwan to participate in major inter-
national organizations the amendment enhanced Taiwan's 
international personality. 
Representative Lagomarsino offered a parallel amendment to 
the Boren Amendment, which protected Taiwan's diplomatic prop-
erty in the United States. He also offered an amendment stating if 
Taiwan were attacked by the mainland the United States should 
consider withdrawing diplomatic recognition of the People's Repub-
lic of China. This amendment was rejected by the House because it 
would have jeopardized White House acceptance of the legislation. 
The initial Taiwan Omnibus legislation left the ROC's security 
uncertain. Congress acted swiftly to amend the bill with a security 
guarantee that would leave no room for interpretation by the PRC. 
As seen above, the bill spells out very clearly that any military attack 
or economic coercion against Taiwan would be a threat to the secur-
ity of the Western Pacific and of grave concern to the United States. 
The bill also makes clear to the PRC that normalization of relations 
is reliant on their good behavior. 
Congressional amendation of the President's Taiwan Omnibus 
Bill resulted, for all intents and purposes, in a new piece of legisla-
tion. The Omnibus legislation was an administrative outline defin-
ing the new approach the United States would take in its relations 
with a "derecognized" Taiwan. Congressional action transformed 
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this bill into a statement of continued American commitment to Tai-
wan's peace and security. US concern was clearly stated, the option 
of retaliation was left open in the event of a future PRC attack on 
Taiwan, and access to American military equipment was pledged for 
Taiwan. Since Congress sought to reinforce Taiwan's political stat-
ure in the postnormalization period, and attempted to create an ade-
quate deterrence vis-a-vis the PRC, the logical question to ask is 
whether these objectives have been achieved? 
Taiwan's independent political status needed bolstering to 
counter PRC claims of sovereignty over the islands. By defining the 
"people on Taiwan" as including the government and its organs, and 
by allowing the ROC to keep its diplomatic property in the United 
States, Congress implicitly acknowledged the legitimacy of the Na-
tionalist Government. This countered President Carter's implied 
recognition of PRC sovereignty over Taiwan. Therefore, the United 
States would not consider mainland aggression against Taiwan a 
simple internal Chinese matter. Congress has thus effectively rein-
forced Taiwan's stature in the wake of its derecognition. 
Did Congress adequately restore a credible deterrence to Tai-
wan's defenses? It would be helpful to review the deterrence criteria 
set out earlier: first, the defender's interests must be clearly engaged 
in the country in question; second, the defender must possess a credi-
ble retaliatory capability and must communicate to the potential ag-
gressor the will to use it; third, the defended country should possess 
an adequate defense capability (i.e., one capable of inflicting prohib-
itive damages on the aggressor). 
Section two of the Taiwan Relations Act very clearly stated that 
American political and economic interests are engaged in the peace-
ful existence of Taiwan and that aggression against Taiwan would be 
of grave concern to the United States. It can be said that Congress 
adequately fulfilled the communication requirement by enunciating 
American interests in Taiwan. In regard to the second criterion, no 
one doubts the capacity of the United States to retaliate when its 
interests are threatened. In the Taiwan Relations Act, Congress spe-
cifically left open the option of retaliation against Mainland China if 
it attacks Taiwan (Section 2; Paragraph 6). President Carter's re-
moval of the "fear element" in ROC deterrence had been effectively 
countered. The PRC once again had to worry about an adverse 
American response to its aggression. US commitment and capability 
have been properly signalled to Peking. 
Congress attempted to rectify any adverse effect President 
Carter's actions might have had on Taiwan's general deterrence. AI-
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though the Administration pledged to continue the sale of defensive 
arms to Taiwan, immediately following the normalization an-
nouncement the President imposed a one-year moratorium on these 
sales. Section Two, Paragraph Five of the Taiwan Relations Act sig-
nalled to both Peking and Taipei the American commitment to con-
tinue to supply the ROC military. In order to ensure the proper 
implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act, the House-Senate con-
ference committee established a regular review process to be carried 
out by the foreign relations committees. 
THE KOREAN PARALLEL 
A Case Study in Deterrence and Signaling Failure 
In order to put the possible ramifications of President Carter's 
action into perspective it will be helpful to employ a historical paral-
lel. An examination of the Korean parallel will also highlight the 
wisdom of Congressional steps taken to uphold and restate the con-
tinuing American commitment to the defense of Taiwan. President 
Carter's severance of US-ROC diplomatic relations, his termination 
of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty, and his failure to clearly enunci-
ate the continuing American commitment to Taiwan combined to 
produce the impression that the United States was distancing itself 
from Taiwan. The President's signaling failure here bears close re-
semblance to President Truman's similar failure with regard to the 
Republic of Korea. The Korean case, with its parallel to the Taiwan 
situation, shows how failure by the United States to construct an ad-
equate general deterrence led to the necessity of implementing an 
immediate deterrence in order to avoid a serious political setback. 
The result of this inadequacy was US involvement in full-scale war. 
It was Secretary of State Dean Acheson who sp~lled out the 
Truman Administration's defense policy in Asia in his now-famous 
"defense perimeter" speech to the National Press Club on January 
12, 1950. The imaginary line, known as the defense perimeter, 
started at the Phillipines, went through the Ruyuku Archipelago, 
back through Japan through the Alleutian Island chain to Alaska. 
There was no mention of Taiwan or the Korean peninsula. 
When a question was raised about a possible Communist attack 
on South Korea (in light of recent border incursions from the North) 
Acheson responded, "Should such an attack occur . . . the initial 
reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the 
commitment of the entire civilized world under the charter of the 
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United Nations ... " 100 Secretary Acheson had- intentionally or 
unintentionally - established a distance between the security of 
South Korea and the security interests of the United States. No 
American or substantial South Korean deterrent was in place on the 
peninsula and the Truman Administration had failed to supply even 
a rhetorical commitment to South Korea's security. The signal 
transmitted to Moscow and Pyongyang could only have been that 
Korea was not of strategic or political value to the United States. 
The Truman Administration did consider stability on the Ko-
rean peninsula to be important. Acheson recalls in his memoirs that 
a stable Korea was considered important to the security of Japan. 
But the Administration relied on implicit policy to maintain the se-
curity of a country that did not have top US priority. South Korea 
was not seen as of great strategic importance, since it was believed 
that any future hostilities would be generated from the Soviet Union, 
which did not have military strength in East Asia. 101 US policy 
makers took it for granted that since we occupied Japan the rest of 
the non-communist area would fall under de facto US protection. 102 
Truman's commitment to Korea, like Carter's commitment to Tai-
wan, rested on the assumption that our stakes in the area were clear, 
but it was not articulated that an attack against South Korea would 
be considered a threat to US interests in the region. This oversight 
led both the Soviet Union and North Korea to assume our interests 
in the South were minimal. Given such a perception on the part of 
our adversaries, the attack on South Korea really should not have 
surprised anyone. 
Thirty years ago, South Korean President Singhman Rhee 
stated, "what is important is the policy of the United States toward 
the security of Korea. What I want is a statement by President Tru-
man that the United States would consider an attack against South 
Korea to be the same as an attack against itself." 103 These same 
words could have been spoken by President Chiang in 1979 and 
have been equally as potent. The Carter Administration's implicit 
acknowledgement of PRC sovereignty over Taiwan, its termination 
of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty, and its failure to provide for 
Taiwan's security in the Taiwan Omnibus Bill would appear to be 
clear signals to Peking that the ROC is fair game. Yet, Mr. Carter 
100. Dean Acheson, Present At the Creation; My Years in the State Department, (New 
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stated that he expects the issue to be settled peacefully and gave am-
biguous indications as to what US reactions would be should the 
Mainland attack Taiwan. Such mixed signals can only serve to con-
fuse the PRC and work to undermine the necessary communication 
of our commitment to Taiwan's security. 
Another similarity between the Korean and Taiwan cases is that 
both US policies were developed narrowly to cover the situation of 
the day. Truman saw the US as militarily stronger in Asia (having a 
large force in Japan) and therefore assumed the Soviet Union would 
not undertake any adventures. Perhaps more importantly, he 
counted on Soviet preoccupation with Europe to deflect any interests 
they might have in East Asia. In this same fashion, President Carter 
has assumed that China will be forever militarily inadequate and 
preoccupied with its northern and southern borders. In both the Ko-
rean and Taiwan cases there seems to have been the assumption of a 
stable situation. But as Alexander George and Richard Smoke point 
out, judgments regarding the value of a small country to its defender 
are difficult to make when the calculus is not based on static strategic 
considerations, but on variables which change over time. 104 Al-
though a fairly stable situation now exists across the Strait, this may 
not always be the case. Under the Carter strategy, we would relax 
our defense of Taiwan expecting the Mainland to remain indefinitely 
in its north-south bind and also forever careful not to offend Ameri-
can sensibilities by attacking Taiwan. These assumptions do not 
take into consideration another pendulum-like policy change by the 
PRC or changes in regional politics. Should Vietnam move away 
from the Soviet Union, the PRC's sense of encirclement would be 
relaxed, opening the possibility of a China-Vietnam dialogue. Be-
yond this, any significant change in the Chinese balance-of-power 
equation might encourage the PRC to undertake an invasion of Tai-
wan - should they acquire the necessary air and amphibious capa-
bility (a not unimaginable possibility). An attack could be carried 
out using the 700,000 troops the PRC has stationed across from Tai-
wan. No troops would have to be withdrawn from northern or 
southern positions. 
Of one thing we can be fairly certain: if the PRC were to attack 
Taiwan, it would come with no warning. If the mainland made pre-
liminary jabs at the islands, it would alert those interested parties in 
the United States of the impending PRC action. China, like North 
Korea in 1950, would choose a quick strike approach which would 
104. Ibid., p. 149. 
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seek to destroy the Taipei government in one massive attack, thereby 
denying the United States the time to organize an effective flow of 
military equipment to Taiwan. 105 This approach is what has been 
referred to as the "fait accompli strategy", which may be the most 
rational way to initiate an effort to alter the status quo when the 
initiator believes that a strong potential defending power has written 
off the country in question altogether or has made what appears to 
be a decision to limit aid to military and economic assistance and 
diplomatic support. An all out effort by the aggressor to achieve his 
objectives quickly confronts the potential defender with a fait ac-
compli, leaving him little or no chance to reconsider and reverse his 
policy of non-involvement. For the aggressor, this fait accompli 
strategy may very well seem the least risky way under these circum-
stances to change the status quo. 106 
Whereas the Truman Administration had no deterrence in place 
in South Korea, the Carter Administration withdrew the deterrence 
in place on Taiwan. The net result of both actions was increased 
vulnerability for the countries in question. The Truman Administra-
tion failed to include the Republic of Korea in its defense perimeter. 
The Carter Administration purposefully excluded Taiwan from its 
security interests. In each case the weakness and susceptibility of the 
country was signalled to its opponent. The fruit of President Tru-
man's actions was American involvement in the Korean War. Presi-
dent Carter's actions never bore fruit because of the preemptive steps 
taken by Congress to adequately arm Taiwan and properly signal to 
Peking the continued American commitment. 
CONCLUSION 
On December 15, 1978, President Carter severed diplomatic and 
defense relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan. In so doing 
he removed the US deterrence that had been employed by the ROC 
against the mainland. Following the US-China normalization 
agreement- which implicitly recognized Peking's sovereignty over 
Taiwan - the Administration further instituted a one year morato-
rium on arms sales to Taiwan. This undoubtedly caused disruptions 
in ROC defense planning and general deterrence, as well as cast 
doubt on the future availability of military equipment for Taiwan. 
The President's action toward Taiwan had negative political 
ramifications throughout the world, hurting United States credibility 
105. Ibid., p. 537. 
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as a defense partner. American stature as a world power was dealt a 
blow by the ease with which President Carter gave in to all of 
China's preconditions for normalization. The failure to guarantee a 
peaceful resolution to the Taiwan issue showed the extent to which 
Mr. Carter would go to placate the Chinese. 
It was left up to Congress to strengthen both Taiwan's deter-
rence capability and to restore credibility to American defense com-
mitments generally. The new American relationship with the 
People's Republic of China should not be conducted at the expense 
of Taiwan. Congress made certain that the commitment to Taiwan 
was carried over into the postnormalization period by inserting the 
security clause in the Taiwan Relations Act. As Senator Church 
stated, "(a) strong unilateral statement was included in the bill giving 
full recognition to the continuing responsibility the committee felt 
this country owed the people on Taiwan." 107 By Peking's reaction to 
the Act, it is safe to say the commitment was successfully signalled. 
On March 16, 1979, Foreign Minister Huang Hua told Ambassador 
Woodcock that the legislation passed by Congress was "unaccept-
able" to China and would do "great harm" to the new Sino-Ameri-
can relationship. Particularly troublesome to the Chinese were the 
security clause, restoring a semblance of Taiwan's sovereignty, and 
the outcome of the diplomatic properties question. 108 
However, the Taiwan Relations Act is not as strong a commit-
ment as it might at first seem. Although Congress has mandated that 
Taiwan should have access to American defense equipment, it lacks 
the authority to guarantee or initiate arms sales. Currently, Con-
gress has only a negative power in this area. It can veto by concur-
rent resolution arms sales to foreign countries, but it cannot 
implement sales. The power to initiate (or more correctly, to remove 
obstacles) resides in the executive branch. In the final analysis, then, 
the accessibility to American military equipment is controlled by the 
president. However, future administrations might not be as reluc-
tant to allow arms sales to Taiwan as was the Carter Administration. 
Another weakness of the Act is that it does not guarantee Amer-
ican retaliation against mainland aggression but only states that 
force or coercion against Taiwan would be of grave concern to the 
United States. Treaties generally leave a "modus fodeiris", vaguely 
defined to enable one of the parties, or the guaranteeing power, a 
way out of the agreement. This "back door" is especially evident in 
107. Congressional Record, p. S2597. 
108. Downen, Taiwan Pawn in the China Game, p. 49. 
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the Taiwan Relations Act, which is a US law, not an international 
treaty. It does not legally obligate the United States to do anything 
for Taiwan. Although the Act is not a treaty, it does have the force 
of law and full support of Congress, has effectively signalled US 
commitment to Taiwan to all interested parties, and has the enthusi-
astic endorsement of the new president, Ronald Reagan. Under 
present circumstances, the Taiwan Relations Act can for all practical 
purposes function as a treaty to insure the security of Taiwan. 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
J 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
Occasional Papers/Reprints Series 
in Contemporary Asian Studies 
500 West Baltimore Street 
Baltimore, MD. 21201 
U.S.A. 
(301) 528-3870 
1977 Series 
No.1· 1977 ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-00-6 
Chinese Attitude Toward Continental Shelf and Its Implication on De-
limiting Seabed in Southeast Asia (Hungdah Chiu) 32 pp. $1.00 
No.2- 1977 ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-01-4 
Income Distribution in the Process of Economic Growth of the Republic 
of China (Yuan-Li Wu) 45 pp. $1.00 
No.3- 1977 ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-02-2 
The Indonesian Maoists: Doctrines and Perspectives (Justus M. van der 
Kroef) 31 pp. $1.00 
No.4- 1977 ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-03-0 
Taiwan's Foreign Policy in the 1970s: A Case Study Adaptation and 
Viability (Thomas J. Bellows) 22 pp. $1.00 
No.5· 1977 ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-04-9 
Asian Political Scientists in North America: Professional and Ethnic 
Problems (Edited by Chun-tu Hsueh) 148 pp. Index $3.00 
No.6- 1977 ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-05-7 
The Sino-Japanese Fisheries Agreement of 1975: A Comparison with 
Other North Pacific Fisheries Agreements (Song Yook Hong) 80 pp. 
$2.00 
No.7- 1977 ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-06-5 
Foreign Trade Contracts Between West German Companies and the 
People's Republic of China: A Case Study (Robert Heuser) 22 pp. 
$1.00 
No.8· 1977 ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-07-3 
Reflections on Crime and Punishment in China, with Appended Sentenc-
ing Documents (Randle Edwards, Translation of Documents by 
Randle Edwards and Hungdah Chiu) 67 pp. $1.00 
No.9 -1977 ISSN 07~107 ISBN 0-942182-08-1 
Chinese Arts and Literature: A Survey of Recent Trends (Edited by 
Wai-lim Yip) 126 pp. $3.00 
No. 10- 1977 ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-09-X 
Legal Aspects of U.S.-Republic of China Trade and Investment - Pro-
ceedings of a Regional Conference of the American Society of Inter-
national Law (Edited by Hungdah Chiu and David Simon) 217 pp. 
Index $5.00 
No. 11- 1977 ISSN 07~107 ISBN 0-942182-10-3 
Asian American Assembly Position Paper: I. A Review of U.S. China 
Relations 62 pp. $1.00 
No. 12- 1977 ISSN 07~107 ISBN 0-942182-11-1 
Asian American Assembly Position Paper: II. A Review of U.S. Em-
ployment Policy 24 pp. $1.00 
1978 Series 
No. 1 - 1978 (13) ISSN 07~107 ISBN 0-942182-12-X 
Indian Ocean Politics: An Asian-African Perspective (K.P. Misra) 31 pp. 
$1.00 
No. 2 - 1978 (14) ISSN 07~107 ISBN 0-942182-13-8 
Normalizing Relations with the People's Republic of China: Problems, 
Analysis, and Documents (Edited by Hungdah Chiu, with contribu-
tion by G. J. Sigur, Robert A. Scalapino, King C. Chen, Eugene A. 
Theroux, Michael Y.M. Kau, James C. Hsiung and James W. Mor-
ley) 207 pp. Index $3.00 
No. 3 - 1978 (15) ISSN 07~107 ISBN 0-942182-14-6 
Growth, Distribution, and Social Change: Essays on the Economy of the 
Republic of China (Edited by Yuan-li Wu and Kung-chia Yeh) 227 
pp. Index $3.00 
No. 4 - 1978 (16) ISSN 07~107 ISBN 0-942182-15-4 
The Societal Objectives of Wealth, Growth, Stability, and Equity in Tai-
wan (Jan S. Prybyla) 31 pp. $1.00 
No.5- 1978 (17) ISSN 07~107 ISBN 0-942182-1~2 
The Role of Law in the People's Republic of China as Reflecting Mao 
Tse-Tung's Infiuence (Shao-Chuan Leng) 18 pp. $1.00 
No. 6 - 1978 (18) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942181-17..0 
Criminal Punishment in Mainland China: A Study of Some Yunnan 
Province Documents (Hungdah Chiu) 35 pp. $1.00 
No. 7 - 1978 (19) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-18-9 
A Guide to the Study of Japanese Law (Lawrence W. Beer and Hidenori 
Tomatsu) 45 pp. $2.00 
No. 8 - 1978 (20) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-19-7 
The Pueblo, EC-121, and Mayaguez Incidents: Some Continuities and 
Changes (Robert Simmons) 40 pp. $2.00 
No. 9 - 1978 (21) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942181-20-0 
Two Korea's Unification Policy and Strategy (Yong Soon Yim) 82 pp. 
Index $2.00 
1979 Series 
No. 1 - 1979 (22) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-21-9 
Asian Immigrants and Their Status in the U.S. (Edited by Hungdah 
Chiu) 54 pp. $2.00 
No. 2 - 1979 (23) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-22-7 
Social Disorder in Peking After the 1976 Earthquake Revealed by a Chi-
nese Legal Documents (Hungdah Chiu) 20 pp. $2.00 
No. 3 - 1979 (24) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942181-23-5 
The Dragon and the Eagle - A Study of U.S.-People's Republic of 
China Relations in Civil Air Transport (Jack C. Young) 65 pp. $3.00 
No. 4 - 1979 (25) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-24-3 
Chinese Women Writers Today (Edited by Wai-lim Yip and William 
Tay) 108 pp. $3.00 
No. 5 - 1979 (26) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-25-1 
Certain Legal Aspects of Recognizing the People's Republic of China 
(Hungdah Chiu) 49 pp. $2.00 
No. 6 - 1979 (27) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942181-26-X 
China's Nationalization of Foreign Firms: The Politics of Hostage Capi-
talism, 1949-1957 (Thomas N. Thompson) 80 pp. Index $3.00 
No. 7 - 1979 (28) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942181-27-8 
U.S. Status of Force Agreement with Asian Countries: Selected Studies 
(Charles Cochran and Hungdah Chiu) 130 pp. Index $2.50 
No. 8 - 1979 (29) ISSN 0730-0107 
China's Foreign Aid in 1978 (John F. Copper) 45 pp. 
ISBN 0-942181-28-6 
$2.00 
1980 Series 
No. 1 - 1980 (30) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-29-4 
The Chinese Connection and Normalization (Edited by Hungdah Chiu 
and Karen Murphy) 200 pp. Index $5.00 
No. 2 - 1980 (31) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-30-8 
The Conceptual Foundations of U.S. China Policy: A Critical Review 
(James C. Hsiung) 17 pp. $1.00 
No. 3 - 1980 (32) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-31-6 
Policy, Proliferation and the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty: U.S. Strate-
gies and South Asian Prospects (Joanne Finegan) 61 pp. $2.50 
No. 4 - 1980 (33) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-32-4 
A Comparative Study of Judicial Review Under Nationalist Chinese and 
American Constitutional Law (Jyh-pin Fa) 200 pp. Index $3.50 
No. 5 - 1980 (34) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-33-2 
Certain Problems in Recent Law Reform in the People's Republic of 
China (Hungdah Chiu) 34 pp. $1.50 
No. 6 - 1980 (35) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-34-0 
China's New Criminal & Criminal Procedure Codes (Hungdah Chiu) 16 
pp. $1.00 
No. 7 - 1980 (36) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-3~9 
China's Foreign Relations: Selected Studies (Edited by F. Gilbert Chan 
& Ka-che Yip) 115 pp. $3.00 
No. 8 - 1980 (37) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-36-7 
Annual Review of Selected Books on Contemporary Asian Studies 
(1979-1980) (Edited by John F. Copper) 45 pp. $2.00 
1981 Series 
No. 1 - 1981 (38) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-37-5 
Structural Changes in the Organization and Operation of China's Crimi-
nal Justice System (Hungdah Chiu) 31 pp. $1.50 
No. 2 - 1981 (39) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-38-3 
Readjustment and Reform in the Chinese Economy (Jan S. Prybyla) 58 
pp. $1.00 
No. 3 • 1981 (40) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-39-1 
Symposium on the Trial of Gang of Four and Its Implication in China 
(Edited by James C. Hsiung) 118 pp. $2.50 
No. 4 - 1981 (41) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-40-5 
China and the Law of the Sea Conference (Hungdah Chiu) 30 pp. $2.00 
No. 5 - 1981 (42) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-41-3 
China's Foreign Aid in 1979-80 (John Franklin Copper) 54 pp. $2.00 
No. 6 - 1981 (43) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-42-1 
Chinese Regionalism: Yesterday and Today (Franz Michael) 35 pp. $2.00 
No. 7 - 1981 (44) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-43-X 
Elite Conflict in the Post-Mao China (Parris H. Chang) 30 pp. $2.00 
No. 8 - 1981 (45) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-44-8 
Proceedings of Conference on Multi-system Nations and International 
Law: International Status of Germany, Korea, and China (Edited 
by Hungdah Chiu and Robert Downen) 203 pp. Index $5.00 
1982 Series 
No. 1 - 1982 (46) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-45-6 
Socialist Legalism: Reform and Continuity in Post-Mao People's Re-
public of China (Hungdah Chiu) 35 pp. $2.00 
No. 2 - 1982 (47) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-46-4 
Kampuchea, The Endless Tug of War (Justus M. Vander Kroef) 51 pp. 
$2.50 
No. 3 - 1982 (48) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-47-2 
Social Change on Mainland China and Taiwan, 1949-1980 (Alan P.L. 
Liu) 55 pp. $3.00 
No. 4 - 1982 (49) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-48-0 
Taiwan's Security and United States Policy: Executive and Congres-
sional Strategies (Michael S. Frost) 39 pp. $2.50 

----------------------------------
ORDER FORM 
To Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian 
Studies, University of Maryland School of Law, 500 West 
Baltimore Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21201, U.S.A 
Check One: 
0 Please Send: 
No. Author Title Copies 
0 Please start my subscription of the OPRSCAS: 
Starting issue -----
Subscription price is U.S. $10.00 for 8 issues (regardless of the 
price of individual issues in the U.S. and Canada and $12.00 
for overseas.) 
My check of U.S. $ is enclosed copy(s) 
of invoice/receipt required. (Institution/library may request 
billing before making payment) (Make check payable to 
OPRSCAS) 
Please send book to: 
Name/Corp./Library: 
Address: (Please include zip code) 
----------------------------------

